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Abstract
Common-property fishing is a classic example of the tragedy of the commons. Driven by competition, rational
fishermen are forced to overfish to maintain marketplace viability. This shortsighted strategy will lead to the
depletion of the common resource pool, and ultimately the destruction of the local fishing industry. In this
paper, we present a dynamic differential system of a finite-resource fishing pool to model choices faced by
average fishermen. We show that the situation mirrors a Prisonor’s Dilemma on the short- and long-terms,
where overfishing is always the dominant Nash equilibrium strategy. Additionally, we use the model to analyze
a multitude of policy measures to address the problem, and qualify their impact depending on how
governments approach burden distribution.
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 A Brief History of Fish 
 
“The cod fishery, the herring fishery, the pilchard fishery, the mackerel 
fishery, and probably all the great sea fisheries, are inexhaustible: that is to 
say that nothing we do seriously affects the number of fish. And any attempt 
to regulate these fisheries seems consequently, from the nature of the case, to 
be useless.” 
Thomas H Huxley 
 
 
For the most part of human history, fishing was considered an environmentally 
sustainable activity. Ocean resources were treated as if they were infinite and 
inexhaustible -even by prominent biologists like Thomas H Huxely (Kurlansky 1997).  
Primitive fishing technologies as well as the relatively small number of fishermen 
helped preserve local and global supply pools and lend credence to this line of 
thought. Resource-depletion on the high seas was rarely an issue due to low fishing 
rates and the small number of human populations dependent on the ocean for food.  
 
The turn of the 19th century saw this view reassessed. The Industrial Revolution had 
brought new technologies that transformed fishing into a more efficient and lucrative 
trade. Steam trawlers made it easier to reach further into the sea, and improved 
navigation facilitated the localization of fish populations (Payne, 2009). Over time, 
these technologies improved fishing beyond what is biologically sustainable, 
threatening the livelihood of the very fishermen for whom these technologies were 
invented. 
 
Realizing the danger, a number of countries including Canada and the US founded 
the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) in 1949 
(Anderson 1998). ICNAF’s mission was to monitor, research and preserve the fishing 
stocks of a large swatch of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean, including all of New 
England’s fishing zones. Over time, minimum mesh, fish, and net size standards were 
set and implemented. These regulations are believed to have helped reduce 
exploitation and overfishing in those waters, although there were deficiencies in 
monitoring and enforcement. 
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 In 1979, ICNAF was dissolved and, owing pressure from fishermen and their 
advocates, regulations were relaxed (Anderson 1998). New England’s already 
overfished stocks faced even greater pressure, devastating several fish stocks and 
driving many fisheries into bankruptcy (Dobbs, 1992; Ingrassia, 1991). Some 
estimates put fishermen’s revenue decline between the 1980’s and the 1990’s at more 
than 50%, and the number of species that were pushed dangerously close to 
extinction in the region at more than 30 (EDF 2011). 
 
To understand what has happened and suggest solutions to the problem, we use a 
mathematical model that accounts for the major forces at play in the fish market. 
The model, albeit simplistic, attempts to establish payoffs in a time-dependent 
dynamic system. 
 
1.2  Modeling 
Modeling fish populations is a common academic exercise among biologists. In the 
1950’s, this type of modeling was coupled with economic theories for the first time to 
produce predictions about the fish market (Burkenroad and Newcombe 1952). These 
predictive tools evolved over time to give us an increasingly accurate picture of the 
fish trade around the world. 
For the purposes of this paper, we will build a bio-economic model that produces an 
output specifically tailored for a normal-form game. In this manner, we will be able 
to analyze and make predictions about the equilibrium solutions of the model using 
game theory. 
 
Furthermore, we will be using the model to estimate the effects different factors have 
on the market, and predict the optimal strategies that regulatory bodies can take to 
control overfishing and stop the exploitation of fish resources. 
 
We will build this model in three stages:  
1. Biological: model a natural fish population experiencing human fishing; 
2. Individual fisherman: calculate how many fish are caught given the fish 
population calculated in step 1; 
3. a. Add supply-demand economics: very simplistically, approximate the 
amount of money made by a fisherman catching the amount fish calculated in 
step II.  
b. Add the number of fishermen into our model so we can simulate firms’ 
entrance or exit from the market. 
 
After constructing the model, we will qualitatively describe the impact a number of 
different policies will have on fishermen and the fish market. 
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2 The Model 
 
2.1 Biological Population 
We start with a simple fish population growing at an exponential rate: 
 𝛿𝑝𝛿𝑡 = 𝑔𝑝(𝑡)  (I.I) 
where p is the size of the fish population and g is the growth constant. A table of all 
symbols used in this derivation is available at the end of the paper. 
 
In a fishing community U of N individuals, we can calculate the overall fishing rate 
of that community fo(U) as: ∀𝑁 ∈ ℕ( 𝑓!!! = 𝑓! 𝐶 )  (I.II) 
where fi is the individual fishing rating. 
 
Including overall fishing rate (fo) and biological carrying capacity (K) into Eq I.I 
yields: 𝑝 = 𝑔𝑝(𝑡) 1 − 𝑝 𝑡𝐾 − 𝑓!𝑝(𝑡) 
 
 
(I.III.I) 
The solution to this first-order nonlinear ordinary differential equation is: 
 𝑝 𝑡 = − 𝐾 𝑔 − 𝑓 𝑒!  !"!!"𝑒!  !"!!" + 𝑔𝑒!  !"!!" 
 
where C is the constant of integration. 
(I.III.II) 
 
If we set p(0)=Po, fish population at t=0, we can solve for the constant: 
 
𝐶 = log −−𝑓𝐾 − 𝑔𝐾 + 𝑔𝑃!𝑓 − 𝑔𝑓 − 𝑔  
 
(I.III.III) 
 
At this point, the solution is reasonable. We managed to show that should the 
fishing rate (fo) be greater than the growth constant (g), we would have a negative 
growth rate and the population will decline to zero. If the fishing rate was greater or 
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 the two rates were equal, we would have a stable fish population at some conditions-
specific equilibrium.  
 
2.2 Individual fishing 
For the second stage of our analysis, we need to calculate the individual fishing rate 
for a unique individual j. For this, we have two fundamental identity premises: 
 
• ∃𝑖 ∈ 𝐶(𝑓! = 𝑓!), and   
• 𝑁𝑓!(𝐶) − 𝑓! ≅ 0, such that: 
 ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐶 ∧ 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 𝑑!𝑓!𝑑𝑡! ≠ 𝑑!𝑓!𝑑𝑡!  
Additionally, we assume: 
 
• 𝑓! ∝ 𝑁!!,  and   
• 𝑓! ∝ 𝑟, 
 
where N is the total number of fishermen, and r is the probability the individual’s 
fishing rate converging to some maximum (i.e. overfish). The reason for this setup 
will become evident once we have the final system. 
 
The conditions above state, respectively: 
 
• j belongs to the universal domain C. 
• j’s actions are independent of i for i ≠ j. This is done to avoid simultaneous 
causality given equation I.II. In other words, we assume N is big enough that 
j’s actions do not significantly change fo, nor do they reflect any 2nd moment 
movement in i. 
• The more fishermen there are, the less the individual fishing rate will be 
owing competition, 
• For any individual j, fj will increase the more likely it is j overfishes, such 
that: 𝑓! = 𝑟𝑓!"# 
 
All assumptions are reasonable in a realistic setting where there are thousands of 
fishermen, and a single individual’s action is not likely to impact the fishing 
community as a whole. 
 
Based on the assumptions, we can represent the expected value of j’s fishing rate as: 
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 𝑓! = 𝜑𝑟𝑓!"#/𝑁 
 
(II.I) 
where 𝜑 is a constant encompassing j’s fishing capability, including technology, size, 
fishing efficiency, and in the case of firms, number of fishermen working for the 
company. Hereafter, we will refer to this constant as inherent capability. 
 
Putting this together with Equation I.III.I gives us amount of fish caught by j (𝛼!): 
 𝛼! 𝑡 = 𝜑𝑓!"#𝑟𝑁 . 𝑝(𝑡)  
 
(II.II) 
 
This equation tells us that fish caught by j will increase with: 
i. Increasing fish population (linear relationship, built into our model), 
ii. Increasing probability of j overfishing (i.e. increasing r), 
iii. Better inherent fishing capability 𝜑. 
 
Furthermore: 
iv. Caught fish will converge to a particular value with time iff g>fo. 
 
And it will decrease with: 
v. Increasing overall fishing rate (fo), 
vi. Increasing number of competitors (increasing N). 
 
2.3 Economic Payoff 
The third step is factoring in basic supply-demand economics to get the total amount 
of money earned by j. First, we assume an Eskimoan market as per Dockner (1989) 
where: 
 𝑣 𝑓!𝑁 = 𝑓!𝑁 !! 
 
(III.I) 
 
where 𝑣 𝑓!𝑁  is the market value of 𝑓!𝑁. 
 
This equation tells us that value decreases with increasing fish market availability 
(supply) as represented by the number of fishermen multiplied by their fishing rate 
(fo). In other words, this is the total biomass of fish that is available for purchase.  
 
Our final equation giving expected return to a fisherman j is1: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Note: implicit model assumptions: 
• Isolated market where outside forces, i.e. exports and imports, are not factored in. 
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  𝑈! 𝑡 = 𝑝 𝑡 𝜑𝑓!"#𝑟𝑓!𝑁!  
 
 
(III.II) 
 
In its differential form, the equation can be written as: 
 𝑈! 𝑡 = [𝑔𝑝 𝑡 1 − 𝑝 𝑡𝐾 − 𝑓!𝑝 𝑡 ]𝜑𝑓!"#𝑟𝑓!𝑁!  
 
 
(III.III) 
 
Figures 2 and 3 provide a graphical representation of this equation. 
 
2.4 Number of actors 
The number of other fishermen in the market is not fixed, and it is expected that 
given decreasing returning, some companies might be forced into bankruptcy and will 
no longer sustain their ability to fish.  
 
To model this, we assume that the cost to each company i is 𝜗! and the expected 
return is 𝑈! . Companies will go out of the market when their costs exceed their 
returns, and new companies will enter the market when the average return is higher 
than the cost, such that: 
 𝛿𝑁(𝑡)𝛿𝑡 = −𝑁 𝜗 − 𝑈! 𝑡  
 
 
(IV.I) 
where: 
 𝛿𝑁(𝑡)𝛿𝑡 = −𝑁 𝜗 − 𝑈! 𝑡 ,                      if  𝜗 > 𝑈! 𝑡0,                                                                          if  𝜗 = 𝑈! 𝑡𝑁 𝑈! 𝑡 − 𝜗                               if  𝜗 < 𝑈! 𝑡  
 
 
(IV.II) 
This equation shows a positive increase in the number of companies if there are still 
profits to be made. Similarly, if the average return decreases below the average cost, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• All variables, with the exception of the fish population and its dependent variables, are 
fixed through time. For instance, inherent fishing capability will not increase or decrease 
with time. This is reasonable in a fishing environment that has reached its satiation 
point. 
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 companies will go out of the market at a rate proportional to their number times the 
difference between cost and return. 
 
2.5 Final model 
The final time-dependent dynamical model is simply equations III.III and IV.I: 
 
• 𝑈! 𝑡 = [𝑔𝑝 𝑡 1 − ! !! − 𝑓!𝑝 𝑡 ] !!!"#!!!!!(!)  
 
• 𝑁(𝑡) =   −𝑁 𝜗 − 𝑈! 𝑡  
 
 
2.6 Limitations of the model 
While the model makes a number of simplistic assumptions stated explicitly as we 
progressively built it in this section, there are a number of factors that need to be 
considered: 
i. This model can be thought of as modeling a single species or the general 
population of fish on the whole. In either case, there are considerable 
deficiencies: neglecting inter-species interactions in the case of the former 
and ignoring inter-species differences in the latter; 
ii. Overall fishing rate, as well as the costs, fishing capability, other factors 
we assumed constant are likely to change as a function of time rather than 
remain constant, 
iii. Prices will fluctuate not only as a result of changes in local fish market 
availability, but also as a result of changes in global supply/demand 
chains. 
 
3 Results 
To demonstrate that this situation resembles a prisoner’s dilemma, we need to write 
individual payoffs in a 2x2 matrix. This can be done by changing two variable 
parameters: r and fo. The former is controlled by j and represents the probability 
that j overfishes; the latter by the crowd and represents the crowd overfishing. Thus, 
we can represent j’s utility as a function of both parameters (i.e. 𝑈! 𝑟, 𝑓! )2: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Note: The payoff for N-i players was purposefully dropped since we are mainly concerned with 
individual payoffs. That said, the payoff for society in most cases can be thought of as: 𝑈! 𝑡 = 𝑈!!!!!  
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Where  A = 𝑈! =   !"!!(!)! . 𝑓!!"#/𝑓!!" as 𝑝 → 1,&  𝑓! → 𝑓!!" 
Similarly:  B = 𝑈! =    !!!!(!)! as 𝑝 → 1,&  𝑓! → 𝑓!"# 
  X = 𝑈! =   !"!!(!)!  as 𝑝 → 0,&  𝑓! → 𝑓!!" 
  Y = 𝑈! =   !"!!(!)! . 𝑓!!"#/𝑓!!"   as 𝑝 → 0,&  𝑓! → 𝑓!" 
 
 
We can easily see that, under any given set of circumstances, the following is always 
true: 
 𝐴 ≫ 𝐵 ≡ 𝑋 > 𝑌 
 
These are the relative payoffs for a prisoner’s dilemma game, where defection (A, B) 
is always better than cooperating. This is true at time t=0, when the game is just 
beginning. To analyze it over time, we let 𝑡 → ∞: 
 
  N-j players 
 
 
P
la
ye
r 
j  Don’t Overfish Overfish Don’t Overfish 𝑋 → 𝑈!!"#$%$&'$#( 𝑌 → 0 
Overfish 𝐴 → 𝑈!!"#$%$&'$#( 𝐵 → 0 
 
Under reasonable circumstances (0< 𝑡 ≪ ∞),we  can  show  that: 
 𝐴 > 𝑋 > 𝐵 ≡ 𝑌 
 
 
  
  N-j players 
 
 
P
la
ye
r 
j  Don’t Overfish Overfish Don’t Overfish X   Y 
Overfish A B 
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 4 Discussion 
 
4.1 Model implications 
In this paper, we created a model of a finite common-resource pool and calculated 
the payoffs for an average user of this pool. Our results show that average fishermen 
are trapped in a Prisoner’s Dilemma-type problem where the Nash equilibrium 
solution is exploitation of the common resource. Introduction of economic measures 
reinforced this problem because of the two-level competition built into the model: the 
first level is for catching the fish and the second is for selling it. An environmentally 
aware fisherman unilaterally fishing at a responsible rate will be punished harshly in 
the marketplace; not only is he selling less fish, but he is also selling the fish at a 
lower price than he would have been had everyone fished at his rate. 
 
On the long run, and assuming fishing strategies and number of fisheries are 
unchanged, there would be a steady march towards equilibrium. Naturally, this long-
term equilibrium is always less than it would have been if the fishing rate were zero, 
even if the fishing rate is sustainable (i.e. below the natural growth rate). This 
conclusion fulfills, numerically, Burkenroad’s predictions in the theory of the 
maximum equilibrium yield (Burkenroad 1953), which stated that the maximum 
equilibrium yield is always less than the optimal yield given there is any level of 
fishing. 
 
Finally, the model shows that the march towards equilibrium is faster the bigger the 
difference is between the fish’s growth rate and the fishing rate.  Formally, this 
means that the rate of change in utility over time is proportional to said difference. 
 
We can use the general conclusions of this model to draft policy recommendations 
and predict the effect of these recommendations on the fishing market and the 
average fisherman’s utility. 
 
4.2 Controllable parameters 
Before suggesting policy recommendations, we need to identify the model variables 
that can reasonably be controlled by the government, and the impact changing each 
would have on the expected utility of fishermen. These factors are:  
 
A. Inherent fishing capability (𝜑), 
This can be controlled through regulations on net, fish, mesh size, etc. By 
imposing regulations on these parameters, the government will be decreasing 
the expected utility for all fishermen by decreasing their efficiency. In effect, 
9
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 this will indirectly decrease the number of fishermen and the overall fishing 
rate (Eq IV.I). 
 
B.  Overall fishing rate (𝑓!),  
This can be similarly controlled through regulations on fishing and number of 
fishermen. The expected utility for fishermen who are still in the market will 
decrease. 
 
C.  Number of fishermen (N),  
The number of fishermen is a key variable in the model. It has the largest 
impact on the utility of fishermen, and controlling it indirectly can drastically 
change the payoffs according to the inverse square law, 
 
D. Fishing costs (𝜗),  
Imposing taxes on fishermen can most directly impact costs. According to Eq 
IV.I, the imposition of new taxes will drive the number of fishermen down 
until a payoff-dependent equilibrium is reached. 
 
The above parameters are interrelated: changing one will shift at least one other 
parameter. The following section considers different policy approaches to the problem 
by manipulating a set of those parameters. 
 
4.3 Policy recommendations 
 
4.3.1 Fishing quotas 
Fishing quotas will, ideally, limit the amount of fish fishermen are allowed to take 
out of the common-resource pool, thus decreasing everyone’s fishing rate to a 
government-set threshold. In aggregate, the policy will bring the overall fishing rate 
under the growth rate to allow sustainable fishing. 
 
This solution will work greatly in an environment that has not been overfished 
before. As figure 2 clearly shows, even fishing at a rate equal to the growth rate will 
decrease existing stock according to Burkenroad’s theory of the maximum equilibrium 
yield. If a common resource pool can sustain a durable long-term decrease, then this 
policy is ideal. 
 
In a completely egalitarian society, this solution means everyone is allowed to fish 
the same amount regardless of inherent capability. If quotas are not observed, then 
fines may be imposed. The fines must be substantial enough that it would be 
irrational to overfish. In other words, the fines need to modify our payoff matrix 
10
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 enough to incentivize cooperation. This will defeat the Prisoner’s Dilemma by 
changing the game. 
 
4.3.2 Complete ban followed by gradual easing 
In case of an environment having sustained heavy overfishing, this solution is the 
only one. This measure entails a complete ban on fishing to allow the fish population 
to recover, followed by gradual easing of restrictions. As figure 3 shows, the number 
of fishermen that can fish while still allowing the population to reproduce and 
prosper will gradually decrease with time if the fishing rate is greater than the 
growth rate. However, the converse is also true: the number of fishermen that can 
sustainably fish will increase with time if the growth rate is greater than the fishing 
rate. As such, a government facing an overfished zone should halt all fishing 
activities for a year, hand out x fishing licenses the following year, then 2x the year 
after and so on until a sustainable level has been reached as dictated by the 
biological carrying capacity. 
 
This solution has been implemented in New England in the 1990’s when a complete 
ban on fishing some species was issued (Kurlansky 1997). More recent measures, 
including a 2010 moratorium on all lobster fishing from Southern New England to 
North Carolina, are constantly debated. These measures have proved to be extremely 
unpopular, but are essentially the only way to save an overfished region. 
 
4.3.3 Fishing licenses 
This policy is what rational fishermen are likely to lobby for. In its most restrictive 
form, it will limit the number of commercial fishing licenses to only a few to bring 
the overall fishing rate down. While this measure can, and would, decrease overall 
fishing and potentially save the fish stocks, it is different from the fishing quotas 
policy because it concentrates utility in those with the licenses and deprives everyone 
else of it. For those with licenses, this policy will decrease competition on the high 
seas and in the marketplace, and greatly increase their profits. This is because 
decreasing the competition by, for instance, half will quadruple their profits 
according to our model.  
 
Naturally, this solution will create a huge monopoly for a few actors and produce 
inequitable distribution of resources. Autocratic governments might be partial to this 
strategy as it allows them to restrict fishing privileges to firms or individuals they 
prefer under the guise of protecting the environment.  
 
4.3.4 Taxes 
11
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 This fourth solution is similar to the fishing licenses policy because its eventual 
outcome its decreasing the number of fishermen. It does so by increasing the costs for 
some to the point where they are driven out of the market. This measure has the 
advantage of raising revenue for the government while still saving the environment. 
However, it is likely to be opposed by almost everyone else because it favors big 
firms that can leverage their short-term losses, and survive tighter profit margins 
better than smaller businesses can (Holland 1998). Additionally, the burden of taxes 
is likely to be shared by the consumer who has to pay more for the same amount of 
fish. 
 
While capitalistic governments might be hesitant to impose taxation, this is the only 
measure that will both save the environment and require minimal direct 
governmental interference; the free market will naturally take smaller businesses out 
of the market without the government having to impose a quota or a license system. 
 
4.3.5 Price stabilization through price controls 
This final measure is the most radical, and perhaps the most draconian from an 
economical perspective. Unlike other proposals we have considered, this one will not 
directly change any of the parameters in our model. It can, and to be effective 
should, be implemented in tandem with other policies. Governmental price 
stabilization’s goal is to reduce the incentive to overfish by shielding prices from 
market forces. In our model, that would be akin to reducing the exponent on N from 
2 to 1, and taking economic competition out of the equation. 
 
We believe this decreases the incentive to overfish because fishermen need not worry 
that others are overfishing and are driving the price of their fish down, thus forcing 
these fishermen to overfish as well to make up the difference. This self-regressing, 
destructive cycle can be partially broken this way. A measure like this will provide a 
stable and predictable return to the average fishermen, especially if coupled with 
fishing quotas.  
 
The downsides to this approach are well known to economists. If the price point is 
chosen at an artificially low level, a shortage is bound to happen. If the price point is 
too high, demand might be severely hampered3, and considering the particular needs 
of our problem, this scenario might be more likely than the former. That said, 
intelligent regulations and effective enforcement can make this strategy a success. 
 
4.4 Choice: Burden distribution 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  In addition, of course, to the threat of black markets emerging in response. 
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 If governments are willing to accept that a sacrifice is necessary when dealing with 
finite-resource pools (and that is a tall order indeed in some places), then the choice 
of policy is dependent on how those governments wish to distribute or concentrate 
the burden of the sacrifice.  
 
If the government wishes to distribute the burden equally, it will issue quotas that 
apply to everyone. Otherwise, if the government were to favor a few while shifting 
the burden of sacrifice to the majority, then it will issue a limited number of licenses 
to its favorite companies or fishermen (perhaps akin to how the Soviet Union 
controlled the Caviar trade in the Black Sea by limiting the number of players to 
only those sponsored by the government). Alternatively, a government can let the 
free market dictate what should happen by imposing heavy-handed taxes and 
regulations that will ultimately drive smaller businesses out of the market faster than 
it does larger ones. In all of those cases, the distribution of the burden of sacrifice is 
the eventual outcome of the policy that really distinguishes it from the rest.  
 
Figure 1 shows a proposed (and simplified) algorithm to approaching legislation in 
regards to fishing regulation. 
 
Finally, a quick word need be said here about enforcement. Although we have 
assumed that perfect enforcement accompanies each of our proposed measures, this 
might not be the case in reality. Some policies are easier to implement and monitor 
than others. This is one of the reasons suggestions in this paper might be more 
suitable for stable, and perhaps wealthier, governments that are able to choose their 
most preferred policies than governments in less stable or wealthy countries. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we built a quantitative model of the fishing market to demonstrate the 
necessity of regulations, and then qualitatively described several proposed policies to 
address the problem. Eventually, the choice of which policy to implement is highly 
dependent on the goals of the government as well as the initial conditions of the 
common-resource pool. The only certain thing about the tragedy of the commons in 
New England, it seems, is that governmental intervention is the only way to solve 
the problem. 
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 7 Appendix 
 
7.1 Symbols used 
 
Symbol Parameter Interpretation Bounds 
C Fishing community The universal domain of fishermen in the community composed of N individuals - 
f Overall fishing rate Rate of fish extraction of the entire fishing community [0,∞] 
fi/j Fishing rate for i/j Individual fishing rate for i/j [0,∞] 
fmax 
The maximum rate 
of fishing The maximum fishing rate - 
N(t) Number of fishermen at time t 
Number of fishermen in the fishing 
community U at time t [0,∞] 
Po 
Initial fish 
population Fish population at t=0 [0,∞] 
p(t) Fish Population Fish population/stock at time t [0,K] 
r Overfish probability 
The probability j overfishes, where 1 
means j is overfishing and 0 means j is not 
overfishing (i.e. fishing at a responsible 
rate) 
[0,1] 
Ui(t) Utility function 
Utility function at time t for individual i 
which encompasses the economic value of 
solid fish. 
[0,∞] 
v(x) Market value of good x 
The market value of a good, x, 
considering the total available  [0,∞] 
α(t) Fish caught The amount of fish caught by an individual at time t [0,∞] 
ϑ Cost Cost incurred by fishermen to fish, including maintenance, wages, etc. [0,∞] 
ϕ Inherent capability The fishing capability of a fisherman or fishing firm.  [0,∞] 
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 7.2 Figures 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
Figure 1: a graphical representation of the policy solution 
recommendations based on the nature of the problem and government 
policies. Note that solutions are not exclusive to each style of governing, but they 
are the most appropriate according to our model. 
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 Figure 2 
 
 
 
Figure 2: a graphical representation of Eq III.II using arbitrary units. The 
graph shows how Ui(t) varies with fo and t, while the growth rate is fixed at 0.1.  
Note that equilibrium, the point at which the population stops increasing or 
decreasing, is reached faster the bigger the difference is between growth rate and 
fishing rate (i.e. |g- fo|). In the case of overfishing, this equilibrium level or plateau is 
always zero. Also note that unless the fishing rate is zero, the fish population will 
never reach the environment carrying capacity, and as such, Ui(t) will never reach its 
maximum.  
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 Figure 3 
 
Figure 3: a graphical representation of Eq III.II using arbitrary units. This 
time, N and t are allowed to vary while Ui(t) is being estimated. In this scenario, 
overfishing is being simulated. We can see that the larger the value of N is, the less 
Ui(t) will be. Moreover, larger N tends to reach the equilibrium point, zero, faster.  
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